Working Group on "Cyber Defense & Political IT-Infrastructures"

Problem Analysis

 

The first working hypothesis was that Germany and the United States should adapt and implement different aspects outlined in deterrence theory in order to prevent future (successful) cyber operations against their political IT-infrastructures.

The problem analysis which has been conducted and published revealed that a holistic approach is needed to tackle cyber operations against political IT-infrastructures.

The following areas have been identified for further research and analysis:

  1. protecting the political IT-infrastructure (“deterrence-by-denial”);
  2. assessing options for show of force (“deterrence-by-retaliation”);
  3. relying on international relations (“deterrence-by-norms”/ “-entanglement”);
  4. analyzing the pre-condition attribution.

 

Addressing Challenges

 

A workshop conducted in Washington D. C. on July 10-11 brought together members of the working group on cyber defense & political IT-infrastructures to discuss the results of the problem analysis and the way forward. Based on the outcome of the problem analysis, the working group discussed various ideas on how to address those challenges.

The two main components that were identified are the analysis of the broader geopolitical objectives for influencing democratic processes and the identification of critical points and technologies for influencing future elections. The objective is to “red team” the elections in 2018 (Midterm US) and potentially 2020 (Presidential US) and 2021 (Federal Germany) based on the findings of the working group.  This exercise would then enable the group to make recommendations on how to safeguard the elections (data protection and hardening systems).

The next workshop has been loosely scheduled for spring 2018 to discuss the results of the collaboration on those issues and plan the subsequent policy and outreach activities.

 

Working Group

 

The working group consists of 39 members from civil society, private sector and academia from Germany and the United States. The views and opinions expressed by TCF as a whole (and on this website) are those of the project team and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the individuals in the working group and that of their employer. Any statement linked on the website only represents the views of the respective signatories. The following members agreed to be named on this website:

  1. Emefa Agawu, New America
  2. Constance Baban, Brandenburg Institute for Society and Security
  3. Tore Bierwirth, Institute for Computer Engineering of the Universität der Bundeswehr München
  4. Kenneth Geers, Comodo / NATO Cyber Centre
  5. Nathaniel Gleicher, Center for Strategic & International Studies | Illumio
  6. Sven Herpig, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung
  7. Stefan Heumann, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung
  8. Klon Kitchen, Heritage Foundation
  9. Marco Macori, Institute for Security and Safety of the Technische Hochschule Brandenburg
  10. Tim Maurer, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  11. Igor Mikolic-Torreira, RAND Corporation
  12. Jan Neutze, Microsoft
  13. Steven Nyikos, DayBlink Consulting
  14. Samantha Ravich, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
  15. Thomas Reinhold, CyperPeace
  16. Laura Rosenberger, German Marshall Fund of the United States (in and out)
  17. Matthias Schulze, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
  18. Julia Schütze, Stiftung Neue Verantwortung
  19. Isabel Skierka, Digital Society Institute of the European School of Management and Technology Berlin
  20. Tillmann Werner, Crowdstrike

The Working Group on "Cyber Defense & Political IT-Infrastructures" is part of the Transatlantic Cyber Forum